Brenda Barnes 406 Broadway, Ste. 332F Santa Monica, CA 90401 (310) 795-3762

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JUN 1 3 2012

Plaintiffs-Petitioners in pro per

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

BRENDA BARNES, an Individual; PETER R. 12 NAUGHTON, an Individual: Plaintiffs-Petitioners. RICHARD BLOOM, as Mayor of the City of Santa) Monica: ROBERT HOLBROOK, as a City Council) Member of the City of Santa Monica; GLEAM DAVIS, as a City Council Member of the City of) Santa Monica; PAM O'CONNOR, as a City Council Member of the City of Santa Monica; TERRY O'DAY, as a City Council Member of the) City of Santa Monica; BOBBY SHRIVER, as a City Council Member of the City of Santa Monica;) 22 MARSHA JONES MOUTRIE, as the City Attorney) For the City of Santa Monica; THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA, a Charter City of the State of California; and DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive, Defendants-Respondents.)

Case No. BC 485472

1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND **DECLARATORY RELIEF AND PETITION FOR WRIT** OF MANDATE/PROHIBITION AND ATTORNEYS' FEES AS PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL. FOR FAILURE TO PROCEED AS REQUIRED BY LAW BY: (1) GIVING UNLAWFUL NOTICE OF A MEETING WHERE A DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION: (2) NOT ACKNOWLEDGING IN THE NOTICE, STAFF REPORT, OR ADVICE OF COUNSEL GIVEN TO THE PLANNING COMMISSION THAT A PERMIT TO REMOVE CURRENT RENT-CONTROLLED HOUSING UNITS AT THE PROPERTY IS REQUIRED BEFORE ANY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT COULD BE APPROVED INVOLVING CLOSURE OF THE PARK: (3) NOT USING THE PROPER STATE STATUTE ON TENANT IMPACT REPORT AND MITIGATION REQUIRED IN THE SUBJECT CIRCUMSTANCES. WHERE A DEVELOPER, NOT THE CITY, IS ASKING FOR CHANGE OF USE OF A MOBILEHOME PARK: (4) REFUSING TO ACKNOWLEDGE TO PLANNING COMMISSION THE CITY'S CONSPIRING WITH **DEVELOPERS TO HAVE CITY EMPLOYEES OFFER RELOCATION FEES TO CURRENT RESIDENTS OF** THE PARK ON THE DEVELOPERS' BEHALF. KNOWING IT IS UNLAWFUL TO DO SO UNDER

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THE CITY'S OWN RELOCATION FEE LAW. TO PETITIONERS' IRREPARABLE HARM IN BEING LEFT WITH LESS SUPPORT IN FIGHTING THE UNLAWFUL CONSPIRACY OF CITY AND **DEVELOPERS: (5) ENCOURAGING PLANNING COMMISSIONERS TO HAVE A SERIES OF EX** PARTE DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT BEING CONSIDERED BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION, IN VIOLATION OF THE BROWN ACT AND WITHOUT NOTICE TO PETITIONERS AND THE REST OF THE PUBLIC THAT SUCH EX PARTE DISCUSSIONS WERE BEING HELD. WITHOUT A RECORD SO MISREPRESENTATIONS COULD BE ANSWERED AND/OR FURTHER UNLAWFUL BEHAVIORS SUCH AS BRIBERY COULD BE PROSECUTED, AND WITHOUT NOTICE THAT PETITIONERS AND THE PUBLIC HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO EQUALLY PARTICIPATE IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS TO THE EXTENT THEY WERE LAWFUL, IF THEY WERE AT ALL; AND (6) ADVISING THE PLANNING COMMIS-SION TO ADVISE APPROVAL OF A DEVELOP-MENT AGREEMENT THAT IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE CITY'S GENERAL PLAN

(C.C.P. §§ 525 et seq. and 1060, 1021.5, and 1085 et seq.; Civ. C. § 798.56(g); Gov't C. §§ 800 and 66427.4, Santa Monica Charter, §§ 1800 et seq. and §§ 2300 et seq., Santa Monica Municipal Code Chapter 4.36.020(a)(3) and 4.56.010; California Constitution, Article 1, section 3.).

UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE, EQUITABLE RELIEF AND WRIT REQUESTED

1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION/MANDATE

Plaintiffs-Petitioners BRENDA BARNES and PETER R. NAUGHTON ("Plaintiffs," "Petitioners," or as identified hereinafter individually by the last name of each) allege:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- 1. Plaintiffs are each an individual residing at the subject property, Village Trailer Park, at 2930 Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica, California ("subject property" or "Park"). At all times relevant, specifically since on or about July 10, 2006 when events detailed in this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition began, Plaintiffs have been authorized and lawful residents of the subject property, as immediate family members of the registered legal owner, and as members and residual beneficiaries of the Family Trust to hold ownership the trailer was placed by one of the then-registered legal owners, their son. Each Plaintiff therefore has an interest sufficient to bring suit on behalf of himself or herself alone, based on equitable and/or legal title and residency. Plaintiffs also are taxpayers and voters in the City of Santa Monica, and bring this action in that capacity as well. Plaintiffs are husband and wife and therefore will on occasion as allowed by law speak for each other.
- The subject property is located in the venue of the West Judicial District,
 County of Los Angeles, California.
- 3. All Defendants except the City of Santa Monica itself (identified hereinafter by name or as "Individual Defendants") are employees and officials of the City of Santa Monica and are sued in their official capacities as such.
- 4. Defendant CITY OF SANTA MONICA ("the City") is a charter city of the State of California, located in the West Judicial District of the County of Los Angeles, California. The City is enjoined by law to follow its Charter and the general law of the State of California, the constitutions of California and the United States of America, and all applicable decisional law in the circumstances. That the City has not done so and threatens not to do so in the future are the sole bases for this suit.

- 5. At all times mentioned, Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that ground allege Defendants sued herein by fictitious names, DOES 1 through 20, were and are liable to Plaintiffs due to responsibility in some fashion for their own actions and/or actions by other Defendants with whom they are related or in concert, as alleged herein.
- 6. Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names and capacities of Defendants DOES 1 through 20, and will ask leave of court to amend this 1st Amended Complaint/
 Petition to insert true names and capacities as soon as each is known.
- 7. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that each Defendant, including the DOE Defendants, was the agent, employee, servant, aider, abettor, co-conspirator and/or co-actor of each other Defendant in doing the acts alleged herein to have been done by Defendants, and that due to their complicity in a conspiracy with each other each is responsible for all the damage caused to and need for relief suffered by Plaintiffs and alleged herein, and whether each was the direct actor or because of his/her vicarious liability due to joining in the conspiracy, is responsible for the actions of another or others in the conspiracy.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, a Writ of Mandate/Prohibition Directing Defendants as Indicated Herein, and Attorneys' Fees, Reserving the Right to Ask Leave of Court to Request Further and Different Types of Relief and Damages As Soon As The Existence and Extent of Same Are Known, for FAILURE TO PROCEED AS REQUIRED BY LAW BY GIVING UNLAWFUL NOTICE OF A MEETING WHERE A DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION, Against All Defendants; and against DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive, and each of them, jointly and severally, Pursuant to Gov't. C. §§ 65009, 54955 and 54955.1, and C.C.P. §§ 525 et seq., 1060 and 1085-1103 et seq.)

- Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as though set forth and repeated in full here, all allegations of Paragraphs 1 through 7, inclusive, above.
 Unlawful Notice Improperly Cutting Off Comment Period
- 9. Defendants have a legislative body, "the City Council", which legislates on land use by legislating matters such as development agreements.

- 10. Defendants also have an advisory commission, the Planning Commission, which previews development agreements and issues an advisory opinion to the City Council on whether the development agreement at issue should be adopted by the City Council.
- 11. Defendants are specifically required by law, and therefore have a general policy that they admitted to Plaintiffs only upon Plaintiffs' specific request, to accept comments on issues related in any way to development agreements until before or at the public hearing held by the <u>legislative body</u>, the City Council.
- 12. Nonetheless, in the notice of the May 23, 2012 public hearing before the advisory commission the Planning Commission, Defendants stated that pursuant to Gov't. C. § 65009(b)(1), all issues to be raised in a court challenge to the acts done by the legislative body had to be raised before or at the hearing before the Planning Commission. A true and correct copy of that hearing notice is attached, denoted Exhibit "A", and incorporated here by reference as though repeated in full.
- 13. Petitioners are irreparably harmed by the Notice cutting off the public's right to raise issues to be used in a court challenge, as the public may at any time raise issues Petitioners may be able to use in a court challenge, which they intend to file and pursue if the City Council adopts the Development Agreement currently proposed or any other one that unlawfully destroys Plaintiffs' homes and takes away their rights to adequate replacement housing in a mobilehome park for their mobilehome and themselves, or sufficient mitigation of the impacts upon them if that is not possible, due to the plans of developers to change the use of the Village Trailer Park in which Plaintiffs live, and to demolish their home. These rights are as provided under the local rent control law and state law.
- 14. Moreover, in addition to issues that may be raised by others, Plaintiffs themselves for the first time between May 23, 2012 and whenever the subject development agreement is considered at a public hearing by the City Council may

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27 28 think of issues they did not raise prior to May 23, 2012 or at the Planning Commission meeting.

15. The uncertainty everyone involved in raising issues to be used in a court challenge will face if the Court does not direct Defendants to rescind the cut-off period given in the notice of May 10, 2012, Exhibit "A," and renotice the Planning Commission meeting without such an invalid notice of cutting off the period for raising issues, is immeasurable. This is especially true when all the people likely to raise such issues and make such a court challenge if the City Council adopts the Development Agreement are now, have been for the past six years since the proposed developers served an unlawful eviction notice upon them, and will continue to be in the future under major stress due to thinking the homes they have invested in for periods of decades in most cases and now own free and clear may be demolished, and they will not be able to afford to and in any event are many decades older than when they first invested in such homes, so will not be able to buy new ones in a place such as Village Trailer Park in a City such as Santa Monica, near their families or doctors or whatever their particular personal needs may be. Additional stresses that in the absence of this stress they might be able to tolerate are so much worse on top of the stress of their homes being possibly lost that Plaintiffs are irreparably harmed by almost any additional stress.

Adjourning Rather than Continuing Meeting, Doing So Without a Vote of the Commission, and Not Issuing a Notice of a New Meeting

- Defendants are specifically required by law, if a noticed meeting by an agency such as the Planning Commission has not concluded and disposed of the items on the noticed agenda, to continue the meeting to a date certain and post a notice near the door of the meeting room within 24 hours stating it has done so, and the date and agenda of the continued meeting.
 - Nonetheless, at the end of consideration by the Planning Commission of business at its meeting on May 23, 2012, a motion was made and seconded to

continue the meeting to May 30, 2012, which motion was amended by a friendly amendment to ask staff to discuss in advance all the legal issues that would be covered at that meeting, the chairperson stated she wanted to clarify for the public that no public hearing would be held at that meeting, and then the chairperson stated she "adjourned" the meeting. No vote was taken on the motion to continue or the amended motion. A true and correct copy of transcript made by Plaintiffs from the videotape online of this portion of the Planning Commission meeting is attached, denoted Exhibit "B", and incorporated here by reference as though repeated in full.

- 18. Plaintiffs also went to the meeting room within 24 hours of the end of the meeting of May 23, 2012, at 4:00 p.m. on May 24, 2012, and again at about noon on May 25, 2012, even though most of City Hall was closed, and found no notice posted so stating, or any notice whatever except the notice similar to the one they had received in the mail announcing the meeting of May 23, 2012, Exhibit "A", which was still posted on the bulletin board to the left of the meeting room door.
- 19. Petitioners and the rest of the public are entitled to have a meeting that is not properly continued be deemed ended. Any further business not conducted at that meeting therefore must be posted as old business on a new agenda for a new meeting and noticed as a new meeting, 15 days before the meeting date.
- 20. Petitioners are irreparably harmed by improper adjournment without a vote and no proper continuance, plus not being given the 15 days' notice required by law of the meeting to be held the next time the Planning Commission meets, in that this is an indication Defendants act above the law, as no governmental entity of, by, and for the people, subject to the rule of law, has any right to do in a democracy.
- 21. Moreover, the public should know Defendants will follow procedures they are required to follow by law, not just make up things willy-nilly, as such sloppy procedure in one thing is indicative of all the other kinds of sloppiness in procedure

and substance in Defendants' practices, as indicated in the remainder of this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition.

Secret Changes in Noticed Matters on Day of Hearing Without New Notice

- 22. Defendants are specifically required by law, to cover meeting items as they have been noticed, so the public knows and can be ready to comment at the public hearing on what the commission or body will actually be considering.
- 23. Defendants are also specifically enjoined by law to present all the residents of a mobilehome park that developers want to close to change the use of the land thereof with the Tenant Impact Report at least 15 days before the hearing where it will be considered, but Defendants never presented this changed Tenant Impact Report that they presented to the Planning Commission to the residents of the Park at all, although the staff member presenting it stated she had issued a Supplemental Staff Report on the day of the hearing to the Planning Commission. Plaintiffs are unaware of the contents of that Supplemental Staff Report and make no allegations regarding it, reserving their right to do so when they have a less urgent need to prepare papers on issues already pressing, as is the case now.
- In spite of these two specific requirements of law, Defendants changed the Tenant Impact Report relocation alternatives from the ones that had actually been presented to plaintiffs and the other residents of the Park, in three major respects, removing two of the six alternatives that had been presented, and adding one that had not been presented. A true and correct copy of the relocation alternatives presented to the residents and contained in the Tenant Impact Report served on them on or about the 15th day before the hearing, followed by a transcript prepared by Plaintiffs from the staff report given orally at the Planning Commission hearing and referring to the page of the written Staff Report presented at the hearing, where the relocation alternatives presented at the Planning Commission hearing held May 23, 2012 were written, are attached, denoted Exhibit "C", and incorporated here by reference as though repeated in full.

- 22. Petitioners and the rest of the public are entitled to have the matters considered at a meeting be the ones they have received notice of, not others secretly changed on the day of the meeting.
- 23. Petitioners are irreparably harmed by secret changes being made in what the Planning Commission will see, in that this is another indication Defendants act above the law, as no governmental entity of, by, and for the people, subject to the rule of law, has any right to do in a democracy.
- 24. Moreover, again, the public should know Defendants will follow procedures they are required to follow by law, not just make up things willy-nilly, as such sloppy procedure in one thing is indicative of all the other kinds of sloppiness in procedure and substance in Defendants' practices, as indicated in the remainder of this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition.

Injunctive Relief and/or Writ of Mandate/Prohibition

- 25. Plaintiffs are unable without the intervention of the Court to require Defendants to renotice the meeting without violating specific duties enjoined upon them by law, by including the offending cut-off of comments notice, not giving the adequate 15 days' notice required by law, and not including items to be presented secretly changed the day of the hearing without notice. In fact, since the Complaint/Petition herein was filed, Defendants have sent a continued meeting notice, without renoticing the original meeting, so it is clear Defendants will not unless the Court intervenes begin the Planning Commission meeting process again without the three defects outlined above in this Cause of Action..
- 26. The damage to Plaintiffs from such failure to renotice the hearing without the offending cut-off of ability to raise issues, without improper adjournment instead of continuance and without the required vote, followed by no new notice of meeting as required by law, and without matters noticed to be covered being secretly changed on the day of the hearing without notice, is irreparable as has been stated above, which statements of irreparable harm are incorporated by reference here as though

restated in full. Having to suffer any of this damage without a readily available legal remedy, or in fact as in the case of these three unlawful actions, without any legal remedy at all, constitutes inadequacy of legal remedy as well as irreparable harm.

- 27. Allowing Defendants to unlawfully convince unwary members of the public who have not raised an issue to date that they cannot do so in the future, being able to just dispense with required procedures meant to assure proper decision-making and notice thereof to the public, and being allowed to just change what they gave notice of in secret on the day of the hearing without notice to the public also would constitute Defendants' inequitably benefiting from their own wrong in failing to follow laws applicable to them and passed specifically for the benefit of the public and residents such as Plaintiffs of properties where the City is considering adopting a development agreement that would involve their losing homes that they own and not obtaining what the law requires to be given to them, as alleged herein.
- 28. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in this case, and allowing Defendants to not rescind their unlawful notices and issue and follow new correct ones in violation of laws passed specifically to protect Plaintiffs and others similarly situated from such damage while the case is pending would make meaningless the relief sought.
- 29. Therefore, the Court should enter a temporary restraining order and peremptory writ of mandate/prohibition immediately, issue an order to show cause and thereafter preliminarily enjoin/permanently require by writ correction of all such actions until this case is concluded. This can occur promptly, since this case has legal priority.
- 30. Thereafter, after separate hearing, the Court should permanently enjoin and permanently for all time as long as the law requires what Defendants have failed to provide require by writ addressed to Defendants, and grant Plaintiff incidental damages for prior violations and such other relief, including but not limited to costs of suit and attorney's fees, as is provided by law.

- 31. Defendants claim they have a right to give the offending notice, which Plaintiffs believe and on that ground allege Defendants place at the bottom of every notice of a public hearing by any kind of commission or board in the City, when according to law it can be placed at the bottom of only notices of public hearings before the legislative body, the City Council, further claim a right to dispense with whatever "tiny" procedural requirements they wish, and also regularly secretly change what they have given notice to the public they will consider at meetings. Plaintiffs claim a right to require Defendants to follow the law applicable and post the notice only when the public hearing is before the legislative body, so the public will know it has the full time until then to raise issues and be encouraged to do so (and certainly not discouraged from doing so); further claim a right to have Defendants follow all procedural requirements of law; and also a right not to have Defendants secretly change what they have given notice to the public they will consider at meetings.
- 32. The dispute is a current controversy, and therefore Plaintiffs request a determination of their rights at this time in the circumstances.
- 33. Plaintiffs also request incidental damages for having to obtain legal help to prepare the 1st Amended Complaint/Petition and appear regarding the TRO/writ request.
- 34. Defendants' actions as alleged above were and threaten in the future to be arbitrary and capricious, and therefore Plaintiffs allege entitlement to attorneys' fees under Gov't C. § 800 for costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue about these arbitrary and capricious acts.
- obtain for the public all the rights they have alleged herein for themselves, and therefore they allege they are entitled to attorneys' fees under C.C.P. § 1021.5 for

the benefit they confer upon the public by so suing to enforce important rights, so they and others like them will be encouraged to enforce such rights on behalf of the public, without having to pay the costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue for the benefit of the public.

Damages

- 36. Plaintiffs are unaware of the nature or amount of injuries they suffered, are suffering now, and will suffer in the future due to the wrongful actions of Defendants detailed herein, and will seek leave of court to amend this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition further at the various junctures after future discovery has been completed and they have filed whatever claim forms are needed in the circumstances, when the nature and extent of their damages becomes more fully known.
- 37. Plaintiffs may also have been damaged and/or will in the future be damaged by such actions by Defendants as alleged above and will have suffered and/or will suffer actual damages in ways and amounts that are subject to proof. Plaintiffs therefore reserve the right to amend this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition to allege entitlement to compensatory damages for future similar actions by Defendants before or after trial, according to proof to be presented at the relevant time, and after they have filed the requisite claim with Defendants and it has been denied or deemed denied, unless such claim is accepted.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

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(For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, a Writ of Mandate/Prohibition Directing Defendants as Indicated Herein, and Attorneys' Fees, Reserving the Right to Ask Leave of Court to Request Further and Different Types of Relief and Damages As Soon As The Existence and Extent of Same Are Known, for FAILURE TO PROCEED AS REQUIRED BY LAW BY FAILING TO NOTIFY EITHER THE PLANNING COMMISSION IN STAFF REPORT OR LEGAL ADVICE AFTER THE PUBLIC HEARING, OR THE PUBLIC IN THE NOTICE OF HEARING, THAT ADVISING THE CITY COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBJECT TO THE DEVELOPERS FIRST OBTAINING A PERMIT FROM THE RENT CONTROL **BOARD TO REMOVE FROM RENT CONTROL THE CURRENT 109** REGISTERED RENT-CONTROLLED RENTAL HOUSING UNITS AT THE PROPERTY, AND THAT SINCE A SUBDIVISION MAP IS REQUIRED FOR THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT, THE HOUSING ELEMENT OF THE CITY CURRENTLY LACKS THE PROVISION SO STATING REQUIRED BY CHARTER SECTION 1803 (t)(3)—IN FACT IN THE INSTANCE OF LEGAL ADVICE GIVEN TO THE PLANNING COMMISSION AFTER THE PUBLIC HEARING ADVISING THE PLANNING COMMISSION TO THE EXACT OPPOSITE EFFECT, BY STATING THAT UNDER STATE LAW THE DEVELOPER COULD CLOSE THE PARK WITHOUT ANY PERMITS IF HE GAVE A YEAR'S NOTICE TO RESIDENTS, Against All Defendants; and against DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive, and each of them, jointly and severally, Pursuant to Civ. C. § 798.56(g), Gov't. C. § 66427.4(a) and (c), and C.C.P. §§ 525 et seg., 1060 and 1085-1103 et seg.)

- 38. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as though set forth and repeated in full here, all allegations of Paragraphs 1 through 7 and 9 through 37, inclusive, above.
- 39. No notice that a removal permit is first required from the Rent Control Board for the 109 registered rent-controlled rental housing units at the subject property, before any city agency can approve a development agreement or any other discretionary approval, as is specifically enjoined upon Defendants by the City Charter, is included in either the Notice of Hearing (Exhibit "A"), or in the written Staff Report given to the Planning Commission and made available to the public on the dais on May 23, 2012.
- Moreover, the oral Staff Report presented to the Planning Commission mentioned 17 times that a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") had been

entered into in 2007 by the City with the developers, which MOU required the City to attempt to find a way a development agreement could qualify the proposed developers for a removal permit for the 109 rent-controlled rental housing units at the subject property. However, never in the presentation was it admitted that neither had the removal permit been obtained, nor did the Rent Control Board have any provision available to it in the City Charter to grant a removal permit where, as here and now, the current zoning does not permit construction of as many replacement housing units to be agreed not to be exempt from rent control as the proposed developer must build to qualify for the removal permit, and that therefore the zoning would have to be changed first, before the development agreement were considered by the City Council.

- 41. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that ground allege that Defendants know the City can change the zoning, but they both do not want to admit to the voters that the City wants to change the zoning in order to eliminate the trailer park where plaintiffs live, and also Defendants are afraid that if they do not hurry and approve the subject development agreement—which they would not be able to do quickly if they first had the required public hearings to rezone the area where plaintiffs live—then the public will become aware of what the City is doing and vote the Council out to stop it.
- In fact, the implication by the Staff Report and the oral summary of its mentioning a removal permit 17 times but each and every time referring to the MOU, was that somehow the City had solved this problem, and/or claims on no authority that the City is required by state law to change the zoning. The developer made the very argument that local rent control is preempted by another provision then relevant of the very same Mobilehome Residency Law being referred to here, and lost on the preemption claim in Village Trailer Park, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (2nd Dist., 2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1138. There is no excuse for the City to pretend

it thinks the preemption argument has gotten any better than when it lost at the Board, at the Superior Court, and at the Court of Appeal in 2002.

- 43. Finally, in the advice given by the assigned City Attorney after the public hearing concluded, the straightout statement was made that the developers could close the Park under state law without any permits if no local permits were needed, by merely giving 12 months' notice of closure to the residents. (See, transcript prepared by Plaintiffs from online videotape of hearing, a true and correct copy of which is attached, denoted Exhibit "D," and incorporated by reference as though repeated in full here.) On top of 17 times implying in the Staff Report that the removal permit problem had been solved, this irrelevant note from legal counsel that IF NO LOCAL PERMITS WERE NEEDED --irrelevant as the City knows because even the MOU admitted A REMOVAL PERMIT FROM THE RENT CONTROL BOARD IS NEEDED before the development agreement can be approved—adds intentional confusion to the abundant obfuscation of the Staff Report.

 Injunctive Relief and/or Writ of Mandate/Prohibition
- Defendants to state the clear requirement of both state and local law that all required local permits must be obtained first (or be being applied for at a public hearing within 15 days) before a change of use is even noticed to residents such as Plaintiffs by developers who want to change the use of a mobilehome park (as these developers did in 2006, claiming on no authority whatever that they were entitled to level the Park and keep it empty for future investment). In fact, the City has been for six years making the same unsupported claims that somehow it is required by state law to change zoning. Defendants follow that untrue statement with the implication and sometimes outright explicit statement that somehow these developers had some claim not to need local permits that scared Defendants so much that to avoid litigation they took the side of the developers against their own rent-controlled senior citizens. Defendants for six years have used this same justification and invalid,

 unsupported reasoning to try to coerce Plaintiffs and other residents of the subject property to move, and claiming to the Landmarks Commission and the City Council and the public that the developers have an absolute right to both of these outcomes. Therefore, Plaintiffs believe and on this ground allege that Defendants threaten to continue to so claim unless the Court intervenes.

- The damage to Plaintiffs from such obfuscation, innuendos, and intentional misrepresentation of the law is irreparable. City agencies such as the Planning Commission are composed of persons unschooled in law, and when everyone they work with month after month employed by the City to advise them tells them this same story, Plaintiffs and other members of the public cannot prevail to convince them the City Attorney is just outright misrepresenting the state of the law. Having to suffer any of this damage without a readily available legal remedy, or in fact, without any legal remedy at all, constitutes inadequacy of legal remedy as well as irreparable harm.
- 46. Allowing Defendants to unlawfully convince unwary members of the public and pollute the public's minds with such nonsense also would constitute Defendants' inequitably benefiting from their own wrong in failing to follow laws applicable to them and passed specifically for the benefit of the public and residents such as Plaintiffs of properties where the City is considering adopting a development agreement that would involve their losing homes that they own and not obtaining what the law requires to be given to them, as alleged herein.
- 47. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in this case, and allowing Defendants to not stop misrepresenting the contents of clear laws passed specifically to protect Plaintiffs and others similarly situated from such damage while the case is pending would make meaningless the relief sought.
- 48. Therefore, the Court should enter a temporary restraining order and peremptory writ of mandate/prohibition immediately, issue an order to show cause and thereafter preliminarily enjoin/permanently require by writ correction of all such

 actions until this case is concluded. This can occur promptly, since this case has legal priority.

49. Thereafter, after separate hearing, the Court should permanently enjoin and permanently for all time as long as the law requires what Defendants have failed to provide to be required by writ addressed to Defendants, and grant Plaintiff incidental damages for prior violations and such other relief, including but not limited to costs of suit and attorney's fees, as is provided by law.

Declaratory Relief

- 50. Defendants claim they have a right to make the offending statements, which of course they do as private citizens with a right of free speech, but as officials bound to do public duty and dispensing such nonsense to the public under color of law, they act in violation of Plaintiffs' fundamental rights to not have their homes they own be demolished for the relatively non-fundamental interests that are not even of the level of rights at all, of developers to make millions in profits, the City to make millions in fees and continue its generations-long process of decimating the poorest, most minority-filled, and oldest areas of the City to make the City richer, whiter, and more "world-class" as the City sees it, and planners and land use attorneys to look good to their bosses.
- 51. The dispute is a current controversy, and therefore Plaintiffs request a determination of their rights at this time in the circumstances.
- 52. Plaintiffs also request incidental damages for having to obtain legal help to prepare the 1st Amended Complaint/Petition and appear regarding the TRO/writ request.
- Defendants' actions as alleged above were and threaten in the future to be arbitrary and capricious, and therefore Plaintiffs allege entitlement to attorneys' fees under Gov't C. § 800 for costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue about these arbitrary and capricious acts.

Plaintiffs also are suing on behalf of the public as private attorneys general to obtain for the public all the rights they have alleged herein for themselves, and therefore they allege they are entitled to attorneys' fees under C.C.P. § 1021.5 for the benefit they confer upon the public by so suing to enforce important rights, so they and others like them will be encouraged to enforce such rights on behalf of the public, without having to pay the costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue for the benefit of the public.

Damages

- 55. Plaintiffs are unaware of the nature or amount of injuries they suffered, are suffering now, and will suffer in the future due to the wrongful actions of Defendants detailed herein, and will seek leave of court to amend this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition further at the various junctures after future discovery has been completed and they have filed whatever claim forms are needed in the circumstances, when the nature and extent of their damages becomes more fully known.
- 56. Plaintiffs may also have been damaged and/or will in the future be damaged by such actions by Defendants as alleged above and will have suffered and/or will suffer actual damages in ways and amounts that are subject to proof. Plaintiffs therefore reserve the right to amend this Complaint/Petition to allege entitlement to compensatory damages for future similar actions by Defendants before or after trial, according to proof to be presented at the relevant time, and after they have filed the requisite claim with Defendants and it has been denied or deemed denied, unless such claim is accepted.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

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(For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, a Writ of Mandate/Prohibition Directing Defendants as Indicated Herein, and Attorneys' Fees, Reserving the Right to Ask Leave of Court to Request Further and Different Types of Relief and Damages As Soon As The Existence and Extent of Same Are Known, for FAILURE TO PROCEED AS REQUIRED BY LAW BY FAILING TO NOTIFY EITHER THE PLANNING COMMISSION IN STAFF REPORT OR LEGAL ADVICE AFTER THE PUBLIC HEARING, OR THE PUBLIC IN THE NOTICE OF HEARING, THAT ADVISING THE CITY COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE **DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT, BECAUSE IT REQUIRES A SUBDIVISION** MAP AND BECAUSE THE CHANGE OF USE OF THE MOBILEHOME PARK IS BEING SOUGHT BY DEVELOPERS RATHER THAN THE CITY, WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBJECT TO THE DEVELOPERS MITIGATING ALL THE IMPACTS OF CLOSING THE PARK AND DISPLACING THE CURRENT RESIDENTS WHICH WOULD BE DISPLACED ALONG WITH THEIR MOBILEHOMES, NOT LIMITED TO THE COST OF RELOCATION AS IT WOULD BE IF THE CITY WERE CLOSING THE PARK, Against All Defendants; and against DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive, and each of them, jointly and severally, Pursuant to Civ. C. § 798.56(g), Gov't. C. § 54952.2(b) (1), (2), and (c), and C.C.P. §§ 525 et seq., 1060 and 1085-1103 et seq.)

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as though set forth and repeated in full here, all allegations of ¶¶ 1 through 7, 9 through 37, and 39 through 56, inclusive, above.

The Development Agreement by which the City and Certain third-party developers seek to get around rent control and close the trailer park where Plaintiffs live is unlawful because the City is using the wrong Government Code section about relocation of the current homeowners. It uses Govt C. Section 65863.7, which by its terms states it does not apply, since the proposed change of use requires a new subdivision under the Subdivision Map Act. Govt C. Section 65863.7(a) states: "Prior to the conversion of a mobilehome park to another use, except pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act (Division 2 (commencing with Section 66410) of Title 7), or prior to closure of a mobilehome park or cessation of use of the land as a mobilehome park, the person or entity proposing the change in use shall file a report on the impact of the conversion, closure, or cessation of use upon the displaced residents of the mobilehome park to be converted or closed. In determining the

impact of the conversion, closure, or cessation of use on displaced mobilehome park residents, the report shall address the availability of adequate replacement housing in mobilehome parks and relocation costs.

That code section therefore has to do only with what is required for a Tenant Impact Report under state law in certain circumstances (when a government agency is closing a park). Sequoia Park Assoc. v County of Sonoma (1st Dist.2009) 176 Cal.App. 4th 1270,1285: states that when a developer is closing a park to change its use, that is when there are "displaced tenants due to change of use," and what the developer is required to provide then is "adequate space in a mobilehome park for their mobilehome and themselves", pursuant to Government Code Section 66427.4 (a). If it is not possible to provide that, then the developer is required to "mitigate the impacts" of not being able to provide that, pursuant to subdivision (c).

The reason the City has confused the issue of which section to apply--when the Code section the City uses is so explicitly clear it does not apply--is the section the City chooses to use has a limit on how much has to be paid for mitigation of impacts on the displaced residents, if adequate replacement space for themselves and their mobilehomes in a mobilehome park is not possible to provide. When a City or County or some other governmental jurisdiction has to close a park, it is the agency responsible for paying the costs of displacing the tenants, so to avoid ruination of governmental jurisdictions doing their duty, a limit is placed on those costs, the limit being the cost of relocation. No such limit is placed on what developers have to pay to close a park for another use. Compare Government Code Section 66427.4 (c) to. Govt C. Section 65863.7(e).

61. Besides being explicitly stated in law (specially enjoined by law upon Defendants, in the terms of C.C.P. § 1085), so it cannot be misunderstood by anyone who reads English, much less people who claim to be educated planners and attorneys), the difference in these two sections is only reasonable and fair. If developers are displacing residents to make profits, they have to pay ALL the costs of displacing

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those residents. Otherwise, they are taking other people's property for their own profit, without paying just compensation. If a city is trying to close an unsanitary or blighted park, that is one thing. If, as in this case, a developer is trying to close a non-blighted, 62-year-old park where residents own their own homes and have invested in those homes and their upkeep for up to 37 years, in one of the most desirable places in the world, that is a completely different situation. A developer cannot get highly desirable property unless he pays the price it costs, which in the case of a development like this one requiring a subdivision map, means replacing what the displaced residents have or paying for the displaced residents to replace it.

Injunctive Relief and/or Writ of Mandate/Prohibition

Plaintiffs are unable without the intervention of the Court to require Defendants to state the clear requirement as enjoined upon Defendants by state law that all tenant impacts must be mitigated by developers who want to evict the residents of a mobilehome park in order to change its use. In fact, by combining the misrepresentation referred to in this Cause of Action of what tenant impacts such a developer must pay for, with the tandem misrepresentation of the state of the law referred to above in the Second Cause of Action, the City for the six years it has been trying to push through this Development Agreement has not only been making the same unsupported claims it made in front of the Planning Commission that somehow it is required by state law to change zoning and somehow these developers had some claim not to need local permits that scared the City so much that to avoid litigation they took the side of the developers against their own rentcontrolled senior citizens. Defendants have also for six years been trying to coerce residents of the Park such as Plaintiffs to move and claiming to the Landmarks Commission and the City Council and the public that the developers have an absolute right to both of these outcomes. In addition, the City has pushed the claim that these developers are entitled to get their zoning change with its estimated \$22 to \$40 million windfall benefit to them, without paying a tenth of that to the current

residents on whose back they are hoping to make the windfall with the help of their friends at the City. Defendants therefore threaten based on their past behavior sustained for six years to so claim and act in the future as well, unless the Court intervenes.

- 63. The damage to Plaintiffs from such obfuscation, innuendos, and intentional misrepresentation of the law is irreparable. City agencies such as the Planning Commission are composed of persons unschooled in law, and when everyone they work with month after month employed by the City to advise them tells them this same story, Plaintiffs and other members of the public cannot prevail to convince them the City Attorney is just outright misrepresenting the state of the law. Having to suffer any of this damage without a readily available legal remedy, or in fact, without any legal remedy at all, constitutes inadequacy of legal remedy as well as irreparable harm.
- Allowing Defendants to unlawfully convince unwary members of the public and pollute the public's minds with such nonsense also would constitute Defendants' inequitably benefiting from their own wrong in failing to follow laws applicable to them and passed specifically for the benefit of the public and residents such as Plaintiffs of properties where the City is considering adopting a development agreement that would involve their losing homes that they own and not obtaining what the law requires to be given to them, as alleged herein.
- 65. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in this case, and allowing Defendants to not stop misrepresenting the contents of clear laws passed specifically to protect Plaintiffs and others similarly situated from such damage while the case is pending would make meaningless the relief sought.
- 66. Therefore, the Court should enter a temporary restraining order and peremptory writ of mandate/prohibition immediately, issue an order to show cause and thereafter preliminarily enjoin/permanently require by writ correction of all such

actions until this case is concluded. This can occur promptly, since this case has legal priority.

67. Thereafter, after separate hearing, the Court should permanently enjoin and permanently for all time as long as the law requires what Defendants have failed to provide to be required by writ addressed to Defendants, and grant Plaintiff incidental damages for prior violations and such other relief, including but not limited to costs of suit and attorney's fees, as is provided by law.

Declaratory Relief

- Operation of course they do as private citizens with a right of free speech, but as officials bound to do public duty and dispensing such nonsense to the public under color of law, they act in violation of Plaintiffs' fundamental rights to not have their homes they own be demolished for the relatively non-fundamental interests that are not even of the level of rights at all, of developers to make millions in profits, the City to make millions in fees and continue its generations-long process of decimating the poorest, most minority-filled, and oldest areas of the City to make the City richer, whiter, and more "world-class" as the City sees it, and planners and land use attorneys to look good to their bosses.
- 69. The dispute is a current controversy, and therefore Plaintiffs request a determination of their rights at this time in the circumstances.
- 70. Plaintiffs also request incidental damages for having to obtain legal help to prepare the 1st Amended Complaint/Petition and appear regarding the TRO/writ request.
- Defendants' actions as alleged above were and threaten in the future to be arbitrary and capricious, and therefore Plaintiffs allege entitlement to attorneys' fees under Gov't C. § 800 for costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue about these arbitrary and capricious acts.

Plaintiffs also are suing on behalf of the public as private attorneys general to obtain for the public all the rights they have alleged herein for themselves, and therefore they allege they are entitled to attorneys' fees under C.C.P. § 1021.5 for the benefit they confer upon the public by so suing to enforce important rights, so they and others like them will be encouraged to enforce such rights on behalf of the public, without having to pay the costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue for the benefit of the public.

<u>Damages</u>

- Plaintiffs are unaware of the nature or amount of injuries they suffered, are suffering now, and will suffer in the future due to the wrongful actions of Defendants detailed herein, and will seek leave of court to amend this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition further at the various junctures after future discovery has been completed and they have filed whatever claim forms are needed in the circumstances, when the nature and extent of their damages becomes more fully known.
- 74. Plaintiffs may also have been damaged and/or will in the future be damaged by such actions by Defendants as alleged above and will have suffered and/or will suffer actual damages in ways and amounts that are subject to proof. Plaintiffs therefore reserve the right to amend this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition to allege entitlement to compensatory damages for future similar actions by Defendants before or after trial, according to proof to be presented at the relevant time, and after they have filed the requisite claim with Defendants and it has been denied or deemed denied, unless such claim is accepted.

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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, a Writ of Mandate/Prohibition Directing Defendants as Indicated Herein, and Attorneys' Fees, Reserving the Right to Ask Leave of Court to Request Further and Different Types of Relief and Damages As Soon As The Existence and Extent of Same Are Known, for FAILURE TO PROCEED AS REQUIRED BY LAW BY REFUSING TO ACKNOWLEDGE TO THE PLANNING COMMISSION EITHER IN STAFF REPORT OR LEGAL ADVICE AFTER THE PUBLIC HEARING, OR THE PUBLIC IN THE NOTICE OF HEARING, THAT ADVISING THE CITY COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO HAVE RESULTED AT LEAST IN PART FROM THE LACK OF 109 RESIDENTS LEFT IN THE PARK TO OPPOSE IT. DUE TO THE CITY'S CONSPIRING WITH DEVELOPERS TO HAVE CITY EMPLOYEES OFFER RELOCATION FEES TO CURRENT RESIDENTS OF THE PARK ON THE DEVELOPERS' BEHALF, KNOWING IT IS UNLAWFUL TO DO SO UNDER THE CITY'S OWN RELOCATION FEE LAW, WITH THE RESULT THAT NEARLY HALF OF THE PARK'S RESIDENTS ARE ALREADY GONE AND NOT PRESENT TO OBJECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT AND MORE ARE LIKELY TO BE COERCED INTO ACCEPTING THE UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, TO PETITIONERS' IRREPARABLE HARM IN BEING LEFT WITHOUT SUPPORT IN FIGHTING THE UNLAWFUL CONSPIRACY OF THE CITY AND DEVELOPERS Against All Defendants; and against DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive, and each of them, jointly and severally, Pursuant to Civ. C. § 798.56(g), Santa Monica Municipal Code Chapter 4.36.020(a)(3) and 4.56.010, and C.C.P. §§ 525 et seq., 1060 and 1085-1103 et seq.)

75. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as though set forth and repeated in full here, all allegations of ¶¶ 1 through 7, 9 through 37, 39 through 57, and 59 through 74, inclusive, above.

The City Municipal Code requires and specifically enjoins upon Defendants the duty to assure, in Section 4.36.020(3), that a relocation fee be paid when a landlord seeks to recover possession of a rental housing unit to demolish or otherwise withdraw it from residential rental housing use after having obtained all proper permits from the City, if any such permits are required. No notice that this is so is included in either the Notice of Hearing (Exhibit "A"), or in the written Staff Report given to the Planning Commission and made available to the public on the dais on May 23, 2012.

- 77. Moreover, the oral Staff Report presented to the Planning Commission mentioned nothing about how up to six City employees at a time came to the Park to coerce residents into taking relocation fees from the developer, who, as indicated above in the Second Cause of Action, still does not have a removal permit from the Rent Control Board as required by the City Charter and as acknowledged by the City in the 2007 MOU.
- 78. Finally, in the advice given by the assigned City Attorney after the public hearing concluded, again the flatout statement—possibly even incriminating, certainly admitting knowingly unlawful behavior--was made that the City did not pass a mobilehome park closing law as some other cities did because in 2007 when it entered into the MOU the City realized that with only one privately-owned mobilehome park left in the City, the City could more easily use the development agreement process to close the Park and approve the proposed development. Therefore, anyone with this attitude of how free the City allegedly was to trample on Plaintiffs' and the other residents' rights would not—and the City Attorney did not—feel it necessary to admit he knowingly participated in offering and having the developer pay residents relocation fees, telling the residents that was all they were entitled to under the City's relocation fee ordinance, when in fact the ordinance did not even apply at all, since the developers had not gotten the permit required from the Rent Control Board.

Injunctive Relief and/or Writ of Mandate/Prohibition

79. Plaintiffs are unable without the intervention of the Court to require

Defendants to stop coercing the residents of the Park into moving by telling them not only that a relocation fee ordinance that does not apply does apply, but also by telling them that the inapplicable ordinance is all that applies to require the proposed developers to mitigate effects on them of being displaced from the Park so the use can be changed. Such misstatements to get residents to give up their rights under the law constitute fraud and deprivation of rental housing services under City

Municipal Code section 4.56.010. (As to both of these types of misstatements and coercion, see Exhibit "E," which is incorporated by reference as though repeated in full here.)

- 80. The damage to Plaintiffs from such intentional misrepresentation of the law is irreparable. City agencies such as the Planning Commission are composed of persons unschooled in law, and when everyone they work with month after month employed by the City to advise them tells them this same story, Plaintiffs and other members of the public cannot prevail to convince them the City Attorney is just outright misrepresenting the state of the law. Having to suffer any of this damage without a readily available legal remedy, or in fact, without any legal remedy at all, constitutes inadequacy of legal remedy as well as irreparable harm.
- 81. Allowing Defendants to unlawfully convince unwary members of the public and pollute the public's minds with such nonsense also would constitute Defendants' inequitably benefiting from their own wrong in failing to follow laws applicable to them and passed specifically for the benefit of the public and residents such as Plaintiffs of properties where the City is considering adopting a development agreement that would involve their losing homes that they own and not obtaining what the law requires to be given to them, as alleged herein.
- 82. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in this case, and allowing Defendants to not stop misrepresenting the contents of clear laws passed specifically to protect Plaintiffs and others similarly situated from such damage while the case is pending would make meaningless the relief sought.
- 83. Therefore, the Court should enter a temporary restraining order and peremptory writ of mandate/prohibition immediately, issue an order to show cause and thereafter preliminarily enjoin/permanently require by writ correction of all such actions until this case is concluded. This can occur promptly, since this case has legal priority.

84. Thereafter, after separate hearing, the Court should permanently enjoin and permanently for all time as long as the law requires what Defendants have failed to provide to be required by writ addressed to Defendants, and grant Plaintiff incidental damages for prior violations and such other relief, including but not limited to costs of suit and attorney's fees, as is provided by law.

Declaratory Relief

- 85. Defendants claim they have a right to make the offending statements, which of course they do as private citizens with a right of free speech, but as officials bound to do public duty and dispensing such nonsense to the public under color of law, they act in violation of Plaintiffs' fundamental rights to not have their homes they own be demolished for the relatively non-fundamental interests that are not even of the level of rights at all, of developers to make millions in profits, the City to make millions in fees and continue its generations-long process of decimating the poorest, most minority-filled, and oldest areas of the City to make the City richer, whiter, and more "world-class" as the City sees it, and planners and land use attorneys to look good to their bosses.
- 86. The dispute is a current controversy, and therefore Plaintiffs request a determination of their rights at this time in the circumstances.
- 87. Plaintiffs also request incidental damages for having to obtain legal help to prepare the 1st Amended Complaint/Petition and appear regarding the TRO/writ request.
- Defendants' actions as alleged above were and threaten in the future to be arbitrary and capricious, and therefore Plaintiffs allege entitlement to attorneys' fees under Gov't C. § 800 for costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue about these arbitrary and capricious acts.
- 89. Plaintiffs also are suing on behalf of the public as private attorneys general to obtain for the public all the rights they have alleged herein for themselves, and

therefore they allege they are entitled to attorneys' fees under C.C.P. § 1021.5 for the benefit they confer upon the public by so suing to enforce important rights, so they and others like them will be encouraged to enforce such rights on behalf of the public, without having to pay the costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue for the benefit of the public.

Damages

- 90. Plaintiffs are unaware of the nature or amount of injuries they suffered, are suffering now, and will suffer in the future due to the wrongful actions of Defendants detailed herein, and will seek leave of court to amend this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition further at the various junctures after future discovery has been completed and they have filed whatever claim forms are needed in the circumstances, when the nature and extent of their damages becomes more fully known.
- 91. Plaintiffs may also have been damaged and/or will in the future be damaged by such actions by Defendants as alleged above and will have suffered and/or will suffer actual damages in ways and amounts that are subject to proof. Plaintiffs therefore reserve the right to amend this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition to allege entitlement to compensatory damages for future similar actions by Defendants before or after trial, according to proof to be presented at the relevant time, and after they have filed the requisite claim with Defendants and it has been denied or deemed denied, unless such claim is accepted.

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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, a Writ of Mandate/Prohibition Directing Defendants as Indicated Herein, and Attorneys' Fees, Reserving the Right to Ask Leave of Court to Request Further and Different Types of Relief and Damages As Soon As The Existence and Extent of Same Are Known, for FAILURE TO PROCEED AS REQUIRED BY LAW BY ENCOURAGING PLANNING COMMISSIONERS TO HAVE A SERIES OF EX PARTE DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT BEING CONSIDERED BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION, IN VIOLATION OF THE BROWN ACT AND WITHOUT NOTICE TO PETITIONERS AND THE REST OF THE PUBLIC THAT SUCH EX PARTE DISCUSSIONS WERE BEING HELD. WITHOUT A RECORD SO MISREPRESENTATIONS COULD BE ANSWERED AND/OR FURTHER UNLAWFUL BEHAVIORS SUCH AS BRIBERY COULD BE PROSECUTED, AND WITHOUT NOTICE THAT PETITIONERS AND THE PUBLIC HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO EQUALLY PARTICIPATE IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS TO THE EXTENT THEY WERE LAWFUL, IF THEY WERE AT ALL, Against All Defendants; and against DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive, and each of them, jointly and severally, Pursuant to Gov't. C. § 54952.2, Calif. Const. art. 1, sec. 3, and C.C.P. §§ 525 et seg., 1060 and 1085-1103 et seg.)

- Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as though set forth and repeated in full here, all allegations of ¶¶ 1 through 7, 9 through 37, 39 through 57, 59 through 74, and 76 through 91, inclusive, above.
- 93. From the fact that the chairperson of the planning commission stated that they did not need to so disclose but she "just [thought] it [was] good practice," when she asked the commissioners to disclose with whom of people involved in the case they had had ex parte communications before the public hearing, it is obvious the Commissioners have been given legal advice accordingly.
- 94. Actually, however, the Ralph M. Brown open meetings Act reads in relevant part as follows:

Gov't. C. § 54952.2.

(a) As used in this chapter, "meeting" means any congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative body at the same time and location, including teleconference location as permitted by Section 54953, to hear, discuss,

deliberate, or take action on any item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body.

- (b) (1) A majority of the members of a legislative body shall not, outside a meeting authorized by this chapter, use a series of communications of any kind, directly or through intermediaries, to discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item of business that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body.
- (2) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed as preventing an employee or official of a local agency, from engaging in separate conversations or communications outside of a meeting authorized by this chapter with members of a legislative body in order to answer questions or provide information regarding a matter that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the local agency, if that person does not communicate to members of the legislative body the comments or position of any other member or members of the legislative body.
- (c) Nothing in this section shall impose the requirements of this chapter upon any of the following: (1) Individual contacts or conversations between a member of a legislative body and any other person that do not violate subdivision (b). [Emphasis added.]
- 95. Clearly, then, when every single member of the Planning Commission disclosed that s/he had met with the proposed developer in his office or at lunch, and also met with one resident of the Park and her attorney and a friend, a majority —in fact, all—of the Planning Commission had used a series of conversations to discuss an item on the Commission's agenda, so had violated the duty specifically enjoined upon them by law in the Brown Act not to have a series of conversations with individuals other than City staff about matters before the Commission.
- 96. Moreover, the parties involved in these ex parte communications did not keep any record of the discussions of the Commission's item of business, nor did they disclose at the public meeting the substance of what was said in any of the

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discussions. In these circumstances, the potential is enormous for the public's business to be done by people other than in public, and other than under the public's direction, in violation of Article 1 of the California Constitution, section 3 stating we the people do not give over our affairs to our representatives to handle for us without our knowledge.

97. Finally on this subject, until the public meeting where these ex parte communications were disclosed, Plaintiffs were unaware such ever took place. Therefore, if the conversations were lawful—which Plaintiffs seriously doubt—they were limited to the developers and one insider who were introduced to or knew the Commissioners, so there was no equal opportunity for the remainder of the public including Plaintiffs to participate in conversations reported each to last an hour, when parties are limited to three minutes to tell the Planning Commission why their whole life should not be disrupted by the subject development agreement. In such a circumstance, the damage to Plaintiffs of not being able to participate in the conversations if they were lawful or being able to prohibit or at least have them made lawful if they were not, is irreparable. Once people have been told lies, it is very difficult to undo the damage, but if it is lawful for the lies to be told, at least everyone should get an equal time to try to undo the damage. Plaintiffs also are still unaware whether these conversations under the circumstances were lawful. and therefore without knowing that they were, do not want to themselves ask Planning Commissioners to speak with Plaintiffs in the same ex parte fashion, without a record, without proof Plaintiffs did not try to bribe someone or do some other unlawful act, and without knowing the rest of the public has also been informed of their right to meet privately with Planning Commissioners.

Injunctive Relief and/or Writ of Mandate/Prohibition

98. Plaintiffs are unable without the intervention of the Court to require

Defendants to either stop encouraging these ex parte communications, and/or if
they are lawful, keep records of them and disclose them so the public can be ready

to answer what was said and to guard against unlawful behavior such as bribery, and/or if they are lawful, make sure all the public equally is given an opportunity to participate.

- 99. The damage to Plaintiffs from such ex parte communications seems to Plaintiffs to be irreparable. Certainly is it so if none of the safeguards or equality mentioned in the last paragraph is required for the conversations to occur. Having to suffer any of this damage without a readily available legal remedy, or in fact, without any legal remedy at all, constitutes inadequacy of legal remedy as well as irreparable harm.
- 100. Allowing Defendants not to even have to explain themselves to an unwary public also would constitute Defendants' inequitably benefiting from their own wrong in failing to follow laws applicable to them and passed specifically for the benefit of the public and residents such as Plaintiffs of properties where the City is considering adopting a development agreement that would involve their losing homes that they own and not obtaining what the law requires to be given to them, as alleged herein.
- 101. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in this case, and allowing Defendants to not stop misrepresenting the contents of clear laws passed specifically to protect Plaintiffs and others similarly situated from such damage while the case is pending would make meaningless the relief sought.
- 102. Therefore, the Court should enter a temporary restraining order and peremptory writ of mandate/prohibition immediately, issue an order to show cause and thereafter preliminarily enjoin/permanently require by writ correction of all such actions until this case is concluded. This can occur promptly, since this case has legal priority.
- 103. Thereafter, after separate hearing, the Court should permanently enjoin and permanently for all time as long as the law requires what Defendants have failed to provide to be required by writ addressed to Defendants, and grant Plaintiff

incidental damages for prior violations and such other relief, including but not limited to costs of suit and attorney's fees, as is provided by law.

Declaratory Relief

- 104. Defendants claim they have a right to encourage the one-sided, undocumented conversations. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, find the practice as it unfolded astoundingly rife with the potential if not the actuality of illegality and corruption.
- 105. The dispute is a current controversy, and therefore Plaintiffs request a determination of their rights at this time in the circumstances.
- 106. Plaintiffs also request incidental damages for having to obtain legal help to prepare the 1st Amended Complaint/Petition and appear regarding the TRO/writ request.
- Defendants' actions as alleged above were and threaten in the future to be arbitrary and capricious, and therefore Plaintiffs allege entitlement to attorneys' fees under Gov't C. § 800 for costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue about these arbitrary and capricious acts.
- Plaintiffs also are suing on behalf of the public as private attorneys general to obtain for the public all the rights they have alleged herein for themselves, and therefore they allege they are entitled to attorneys' fees under C.C.P. § 1021.5 for the benefit they confer upon the public by so suing to enforce important rights, so they and others like them will be encouraged to enforce such rights on behalf of the public, without having to pay the costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue for the benefit of the public.

Damages

109. Plaintiffs are unaware of the nature or amount of injuries they suffered, are suffering now, and will suffer in the future due to the wrongful actions of

Defendants detailed herein, and will seek leave of court to amend this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition further at the various junctures after future discovery has been completed and they have filed whatever claim forms are needed in the circumstances, when the nature and extent of their damages becomes more fully known.

110. Plaintiffs may also have been damaged and/or will in the future be damaged by such actions by Defendants as alleged above and will have suffered and/or will suffer actual damages in ways and amounts that are subject to proof. Plaintiffs therefore reserve the right to amend this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition to allege entitlement to compensatory damages for future similar actions by Defendants before or after trial, according to proof to be presented at the relevant time, and after they have filed the requisite claim with Defendants and it has been denied or deemed denied, unless such claim is accepted.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, a Writ of Mandate/Prohibition Directing Defendants as Indicated Herein, and Attorneys' Fees, Reserving the Right to Ask Leave of Court to Request Further and Different Types of Relief and Damages As Soon As The Existence and Extent of Same Are Known, for FAILURE TO PROCEED AS REQUIRED BY LAW BY ADVISING THE PLANNING COMMISSION TO ADVISE APPROVAL OF A DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT THAT IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE CITY'S GENERAL PLAN, Against All Defendants; and against DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive, and each of them, jointly and severally, Pursuant to Civ. C. § 798.56(g), Santa Monica Municipal Code Chapter 4.36.020(a)(3) and 4.56.010, and C.C.P. §§ 525 et seq., 1060 and 1085-1103 et seq.)

- Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as though set forth and repeated in full here, all allegations of ¶¶ 1 through 7, 9 through 37, 39 through 57, 59 through 74, 75 through 91, and 93 through 110, inclusive, above.
- 112. Development agreements are required by state law and the Municipal Code to be "consistent with the General Plan." General terms of the General Plan applicable to Village Trailer Park such as "retain existing neighborhoods" all clearly would be violated if Village Trailer Park, a neighborhood in itself, were bulldozed. Particularly is that so when the proposal is to replace it with yet

- another sterile anonymous apartment-condo enormous mass more appropriate to New York City—if anywhere, it is so childish in having four different kinds of architecture and thinking painting one building red doth a design statement make.
- 113. More specifically and importantly, the explicit requirement of the General Plan applicable to Village Trailer Park is the City General Plan requires Village Trailer Park be retained to the extent feasible. The City has the burden of proof to prove it is not feasible. Yet in every staff report or attorney advice rant the speaker goes right past the part of the General Plan that says Village Trailer Park will be retained to the extent feasible, and starts talking about one of the off-the-wall ways explored earlier by which these people who decided to close the Park in 2007 try to change the subject of what applicable law actually is.
- "Feasible" means "capable of being accomplished in a successful manner 114. within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, legal, social, and technological factors," according to Gov't. C. § 65080.01(c). There seem to be no principles of feasibility applicable—and Defendants have mentioned none—in defining "feasible" as to keeping Village Trailer Park open as a trailer park other than the incorrect legal principles described above in the Second through Fourth Causes of Action, plus the idea of the Park owner being entitled to more profit than obtained from the Park as it was before this Development Agreement was proposed, which would increase the owners' profits by at least 100-fold over the next few decades. Defendants have mentioned this as scaring them into thinking the third-party developers could prove inverse condemnation against the City by its not approving the Development Agreement, so besides being an economic consideration, this could be seen in Defendants' minds as a legal one barring keeping the Park as "feasible," as well. However, the true duty is enjoined upon Defendants by law to recognize that no land owner is entitled to what s/he wants in profits from the land, but only enough not to be deprived of <u>all use</u> of the land, in order to free a city from fear of inversely

condemning the owner's land. The truth, as the Court states in Yee v.

Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd. (4th Dist., 1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1421

[aka Yee IV]:

The central principle, of course, is . . .that a rent control ordinance, like a zoning or land use regulation, "is not invalid and does not bring about a compensable taking unless all beneficial use of the property is denied. [Citations.]" . . . Certainly, at every stage of these proceedings, from Yee I and Yee II through Yee III, it has been clear that (as we noted in Yee III) the Yees <a href="https://paper.com/have not been denied all beneficial use of the property, but have only suffered a reduction in their expected profits therefrom. With this proposition there can be no argument. [Emphasis added.]

- 115. Moreover, no owner of Village Trailer Park has ever applied for a rent increase—and the proposed developers did not apply for a removal permit when they finally did apply for one recently—on the ground of not being able to make a fair return from the property as a mobilehome park. Therefore, there is no evidence available to the City to prove the Park is not feasible on economic grounds.
- 116. The other factors for feasibility are just as unlikely to ever be able to prove, which is why no Defendant has ever mentioned any of the others in a public hearing. One commenter did claim the old-fashioned chestnut that the City is entitled to have its land put to its "highest and best use." However, the reason that platitude is outmoded is the land does not belong either to the City or to misinformed members of the public such as that commenter. In fact, given that the voters of Santa Monica rent-controlled it and have not provided any legal way to get it removed from rent control, the land, although privately owned, remains subject to rent control until and unless the voters change that status. Neither does "highest and best use" even mean maximum development. Overdevelop-

ment in a massive building covering most of the land and blocking sun and air from neighboring buildings, such as is proposed here, which would be almost five (5) times as dense as the surrounding neighborhood, is not defined in any law or treatise as either highest or best use of land. Also, since avoiding urban sprawl is an excuse being offered by some for overdevelopment in urban areas, the subject property is located over 7/10 of a mile from the proposed transit station—although planners for the City often "accidentally" move it four or five blocks closer on maps they draw. Given the standard of Southern California Association of Governments that transit-oriented developments are defined as within a half-mile or less of a transit station, the subject property does not qualify. In fact, no reason appears for Defendants to be able to avoid the duty specially enjoined upon them, to comply with the General Plan by retaining Village Trailer Park as a trailer park under rent control.

- 117. Finally on this subject, neither the Staff Report nor any legal advice given to the Planning Commission even attempted to prove it was not feasible to retain the Park as a mobilehome park as it has been for 62 years and as the residents have a right for it to remain unless the City can prove that is not feasible. That means that the Staff Report and the City Attorney are both recommending the Planning Commission advise the Council to approve a development agreement that is not consistent with the General Plan's requirement to retain the Park to the extent feasible.
- 118. "Consistent with the general plan" means "considering all its aspects, it will further the objectives and policies of the general plan and not obstruct their attainment." Clover Valley Foundation v. City of Rocklin (3rd Dist., 2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 200, 238. A development agreement destroying an existing neighborhood without any relocation plan in conformity with law cannot be feasible, but the preliminary question specially enjoined by law upon Defendants to be answered before any replacement is considered, is not is the replacement

suggested feasible, but instead, is Village Trailer Park feasible. If it is, the City cannot choose something else and be in compliance with the General Plan. This is so whatever its reasons, as impermissible as some indicated above, or even virtuous motives, if the City had any, notwithstanding.

Injunctive Relief and/or Writ of Mandate/Prohibition

- 119. Plaintiffs are unable without the intervention of the Court to require Defendants to stop recommending advising approval of a development agreement that is inconsistent with the General Plan of Santa Monica, and therefore unlawful. That they have convinced each other since 2007 that this development agreement must be adopted is astounding, but nonetheless that constitutes irreparable harm to Plaintiffs.
- 120. The damage to Plaintiffs from such intentional misrepresentation of the law is irreparable. City agencies such as the Planning Commission are composed of persons unschooled in law, and when everyone they work with month after month employed by the City to advise them tells them this same story, Plaintiffs and other members of the public cannot prevail to convince them the City Attorney is just outright misrepresenting the state of the law. Having to suffer any of this damage without a readily available legal remedy, or in fact, without any legal remedy at all, constitutes inadequacy of legal remedy as well as irreparable harm.
- 121. Allowing Defendants to unlawfully convince unwary members of the public and pollute the public's minds with such nonsense also would constitute Defendants' inequitably benefiting from their own wrong in failing to follow laws applicable to them and passed specifically for the benefit of the public and residents such as Plaintiffs of properties where the City is considering adopting a development agreement that would involve their losing homes that they own and not obtaining what the law requires to be given to them, as alleged herein.

- 122. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in this case, and allowing Defendants to not stop misrepresenting the contents of clear laws passed specifically to protect Plaintiffs and others similarly situated from such damage while the case is pending would make meaningless the relief sought.
- 123. Therefore, the Court should enter a temporary restraining order and peremptory writ of mandate/prohibition immediately, issue an order to show cause and thereafter preliminarily enjoin/permanently require by writ correction of all such actions until this case is concluded. This can occur promptly, since this case has legal priority.
- 124. Thereafter, after separate hearing, the Court should permanently enjoin and permanently for all time as long as the law requires what Defendants have failed to provide to be required by writ addressed to Defendants, and grant Plaintiff incidental damages for prior violations and such other relief, including but not limited to costs of suit and attorney's fees, as is provided by law.

Declaratory Relief

- Defendants claim they have a right to make the offending statements, which of course they do as private citizens with a right of free speech, but as officials bound to do public duty and dispensing such nonsense to the public under color of law, they act in violation of Plaintiffs' fundamental rights to not have their homes they own be demolished for the relatively non-fundamental interests that are not even of the level of rights at all, of developers to make millions in profits, the City to make millions in fees and continue its generations-long process of decimating the poorest, most minority-filled, and oldest areas of the City to make the City richer, whiter, and more "world-class" as the City sees it, and planners and land use attorneys to look good to their bosses.
- 126. The dispute is a current controversy, and therefore Plaintiffs request a determination of their rights at this time in the circumstances.

- 127. Plaintiffs also request incidental damages for having to obtain legal help to prepare the 1st Amended Complaint/Petition and appear regarding the TRO/writ request.
- Defendants' actions as alleged above were and threaten in the future to be arbitrary and capricious, and therefore Plaintiffs allege entitlement to attorneys' fees under Gov't C. § 800 for costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue about these arbitrary and capricious acts.
- Plaintiffs also are suing on behalf of the public as private attorneys general to obtain for the public all the rights they have alleged herein for themselves, and therefore they allege they are entitled to attorneys' fees under C.C.P. § 1021.5 for the benefit they confer upon the public by so suing to enforce important rights, so they and others like them will be encouraged to enforce such rights on behalf of the public, without having to pay the costs they incur for help they receive from attorneys who do not become their attorneys of record, or for their attorneys of record if they are able to hire same, for having to sue for the benefit of the public.

<u>Damages</u>

- 130. Plaintiffs are unaware of the nature or amount of injuries they suffered, are suffering now, and will suffer in the future due to the wrongful actions of Defendants detailed herein, and will seek leave of court to amend this 1st Amended Complaint/Petition further at the various junctures after future discovery has been completed and they have filed whatever claim forms are needed in the circumstances, when the nature and extent of their damages becomes more fully known.
- 131. Plaintiffs may also have been damaged and/or will in the future be damaged by such actions by Defendants as alleged above and will have suffered and/or

will suffer actual damages in ways and amounts that are subject to proof.

Plaintiffs therefore reserve the right to amend this 1st Amended

Complaint/Petition to allege entitlement to compensatory damages for future similar actions by Defendants before or after trial, according to proof to be presented at the relevant time, and after they have filed the requisite claim with Defendants and it has been denied or deemed denied, unless such claim is accepted.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs-Petitioners pray::

On All Causes of Action, Against All Defendants, jointly and severally:

- 1. After minimum notice as required by law and separate hearing, for a temporary restraining order and writ of mandate/prohibition and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction enjoining and a preliminary writ of mandate mandating what is specially enjoined on Defendants by law each and every action by Defendants proven as alleged in each cause of action should not be entered, and for entry of such preliminary injunction and issuance of such writ until after trial or such other time as the Court deems just and proper;
- Thereafter, after separate motion and hearing, for entry of a permanent injunction and writ of mandate/prohibition enjoining each and every action by Defendants proven as fulfilling the elements of each cause of action of Plaintiff, until such time as the Court deems just and proper;
- 3. For incidental damages associated with having to obtain injunctive relief, according to proof after appropriate discovery;
- 4. For a declaration affirming Plaintiff's rights as to each cause of action;
- If Plaintiffs request, leave of court to amend this 1st Amended
 Complaint/Petition to add claims for further damages both compensatory
 and/or punitive, as shown to be proper, after further discovery and filing and
 rejection of any necessary claims;

- 6. For costs of suit herein incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to applicable law for Plaintiff as <u>pro per</u> aided by attorneys who do not become attorneys of record, and/or for attorneys themselves after Plaintiff hires same to prosecute this action;
- 7. For attorneys' fees as incurred according to proof for having to sue regarding Defendants' arbitrary and capricious actions as alleged herein, according to proof, pursuant to Gov't C. § 800;
- For attorneys' fees as incurred according to proof for defending valuable rights on behalf of the public, as private attorneys general, pursuant to C.C.P. § 1021.5; and
- 9. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

DATED: June 12, 2012 Respectfully submitted,

Brenda Barnes
Peter R. Naughton
Plaintiffs-Petitioners in pro per

VERIFICATION

The undersigned, says:

I am a Plaintiff-Petitioner in this action, and sign this verification and state the following on the basis of my own personal knowledge.

I have read the foregoing 1st Amended Complaint/Petition, and it is true, of my own personal knowledge, except for matters stated on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe it to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June 12, 2012, at Santa Monica, California.

BRENDA BARNES

VERIFICATION

The undersigned, says:

I am a Plaintiff-Petitioner in this action, and sign this verification and state the following on the basis of my own personal knowledge.

I have read the foregoing 1st Amended Complaint/Petition, and it is true, of my own personal knowledge, except for matters stated on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe it to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June 12, 2012, at Santa Monica, California.

PETER R. NAUGHTON



NOTICE OF A CONTINUED PUBLIC HEARING BEFORE THE SANTA MONICA PLANNING COMMISSION

SUBJECT: Development Agreement 07-005 - Village Trailer Park Development Agreement

2930 Colorado Avenue APPLICANT: Village Trailer Park LLC

PROPERTY OWNER: Village Trailer Park Inc. and Village Trailer Park I.L.C as

tenants-in-common

The public hearing, which began on May 23, was continued to May 30, and will conclude with deliberations by the Planning Commission on June 20, 2012 on the following request:

The applicant is requesting Planning Commission consideration and recommendation to the City Council of a Development Agreement for a mixed-use project consisting of 486 residential units, up to 8,960sf of creative office space, and up to 17,780sf of neighborhood retail space. The project involves the closure of Village Trailer Park. The residential units would consist of 147 rentcontrolled apartments, of which 27 would be deed restricted for very low income households and 11 would be deed-restricted for extremely low income households. The remainder of the residential units would be 339 market-rate condominiums. The project would include surface easements for an extension of Pennsylvania Avenue from Stanford Street to the western property line and a New Road to provide project access from Colorado Avenue. The project would have a building height that ranges between 35 feet and 57 feet. The project would have 838 parking spaces in a two-level subterranean parking garage. The Development Agreement would provide for a change of use of the Village Trailer Park within the meaning of Civil Code §798.56(g)(1). The Tenant Impact Report required by Government Code §65863.7 has been attached to this notice and provided to residents of the Village Trailer Park in compliance with Civil Code §798.56(h). Pursuant to Santa Monica Municipal Code (SMMC) Section 9.48.130, the Planning Commission shall hold a public hearing on the proposed development agreement and shall make its recommendation to the City Council for review

DATE/TIME: WEDNESDAY, June 20, 2012, AT 7:00 PM

LOCATION:

City Council Chambers, Second Floor

Santa Monica City Hall

1685 Main Street, Santa Monica, California

HOW TO COMMENT

The City of Santa Monica encourages public comment. You may comment at the Planning Commission public hearing, or by writing a letter. Written information will be given to the Planning Commission at the meeting. Address your letters to: Jing Yeo, AICP, Special Projects Manager, Re: 07DEV-005, City Planning Division, 1685 Main Street, Room 212, Santa Monica, CA 90401

MORE INFORMATION

If you want more information about this project or wish to review the project file, please contact Jing Yeo at (310) 458-8341, or by e-mail at jing yeo@smgov.net. The Zoning Ordinance is available at the Planning Counter during business hours and on the City's web site at www.smgov net. The meeting facility is wheelchair accessible. For disability-related accommodations, please contact (310) 458-8341 or (310) 458-8696 TTY at least 72 hours in advance. All written materials are available in alternate format upon request. Santa Monica Big Blue Bus Lines numbered 2, 3, Rapid 3, 8, and 9, serve City Hall. Pursuant to California Government Code Section 65009(b), if this matter is subsequently challenged in Court, the challenge may be limited to only those issues raised at the public hearing described in this notice, or in written correspondence delivered to the City of Santa Monica at, or prior to, the public hearing.

ESPAÑOL

Esto es una noticia de una audiencia pública para revisar applicaciónes proponiendo desarrollo en Santa Monica. Si deseas más información, favor de llamar a Carmen Gutierrez en la División de Planificación al número (310) 458-8341.

NOTICE OF A FUBLIC HEARING BEFORE THE SANTA MONICA PLANNING COMMISSION

SUBJECT:

Development Agreement 07-005, 2930 Cotorado Avenue Villoge Tráiler Park Development Agreement

APPLICANT: Village Trailer Park LLC

PROPERTY OWNER: Village Trailer Park Inc and Village Trailer Park LUC as

tenents-in-common

A public hearing will be held by the Planning Commission to consider the following request:

The applicant is requesting Manning Commission consideration and recommendation to the City Council of a Development Agreement for a mixed-use project consisting of 486 residential units, up to 8,960st of creative office space, and up to 17,780st of neighborhood retail space. The project involves the closure of Village Trader Park. The residential units would consist of the remicuntrolled apartments, of which 27 would be deed restricted for very low income households and 11 would be deed-restricted for extremely low income households. The remainder of the residential units would be 339 market-rate condominiums. The project would include surface easements for an extension of Pennsylvania Avenue from Stanford Street to the western property like and a New Road to provide project acress from Coloredo Avenue. The project would have a building height that ranges between 35 feet and 57 feet. The project would have \$38 parking spaces in a two-level subterranean parking garage. The Development Agreement would provide for a change offuse of the Village Trailer Park within the menting of Civil Cade \$798.54(g)(1). The Tenant Impace Report required by Government Code \$65863,7 has been provided to residents of the lyttinge Trailer Park in compliance with Civil Code §798.56(h). Pursuan to Santa Monte Philineigal Code (SMMC) Section 9 48 130, the Planning Commission shall hold a public hearing on the proposed development agreement and shall make its recommendation to the City Council for greater.

DATE/TIME: W

WEDNESDAY, May 23, 2012, AT 7:00 PM

LOCATION:

City Council Chambers, Second Floor

Santa Moraca City Hall

1685 Main Street, Santa Monice, Celifornia

HOW TO COMMENT

The City of Santa Monica encourages public comment. You may comment at the Planning Commission public hearing, or by writing a fetter. Written information will be given to the Planning Commission at the necting.

Address your letters to.

Jing Yeo, AICP, Special Projects Manager

Rc. 07DEV-005 City Planning Division 1685 Moin Bliett, Room 212 Smia Monica, CA 90401

MORE INFORMATION

If you want more information about this project or wish to review the project file, please control ling. Yeo at (310) 458-8341, or by e-mail at jung veriformory net. The Zosing Ordinerses is appailable at the Planning Counter during business hours and on the City's web site at what simply interesting facility is wheelchair accessible For disability-related nonomendations, please some (310) 458-8341 or (310) 458-8696 TTY at least 72 hours in odvance. All written majorials are available in afternate format upon request. Santa Monica Big Blug Bus Lines numbered 2. J. Rapid 3. 8, and 9, serve City Hall. Pursuant to Catifornia Government Code Section 65009(b), if playsanter is subsequently challenged in Coun, the challenge may be limited to only thuse issues raised at the public hearing described in this notice, or in written correspondence delivered to the City of Santa Monica at, or prior to, the public hearing.



Transcript of Santa Monica City Planning Commission. May 23, 2012 Meeting -Motion to adjourn

Chairperson Newbold, (Chairperson) So, I, we are clearly not going to get to the end of this issue tonight. It is now 11.30. We have lost one of our commissioners, uhmm, ah, he's left. I would propose that we continue this meeting until next week...and..we adjourn the meeting tonight

Commissioner Kennedy (Kennedy)

I'll second that

Chairperson

that is a motion

K Kennedy I'll second it

Commissioner Winterer (Winterer) Can...can., do we need to, ah, make a friendly amendment that perhaps the city attorney addresses the issues raised by commissioner Ries and, while some of our questions may be easily answered, I, I, he's, partially addressed the issues raised by the Legal Aid Foundation. I don't know if you've gotten the letter from Ms. Venskus and (inaudible) and sooner, somewhere I'd like to have your interpretation of her concerns about the EIR and other issues

Staff attorney A. Seltzer . um, I'd ...

Winterer Available to us next week

Staff attorney A. Seltzer So we would at the beginning of the hearing, I would work with staff and we would respond to uhm those two items we received, ah, ah, uhm, one of those letters tonight at the end of the hearing

Chairperson

huh, uhm ummm

Winterer issues?

ahmm did you also get the correspondence from Ms. Barnes about legal

Staff attorney A. Seltzer yes

Winterer and they could possibly address those, any of these legal issues, that you know cause, ah, even though I'm gonna go to law school for a week...

Staff attorney A. Seltzer ha ha, will do

Winterer could use your help.

Chairperson So I wanna be very clear for the public, will we have public comment then, is this new issues? 'cause normally we would, when we continue something we would take no more public comment..umm, if we're gonna be looking at Ms. Vaskus, Vaskusses,I'm sorry I'm saying her name wrong, is that new business?

Staff attorney A. Seltzer I don't believe so if you're

Chairperson I think you need to turn...you need to turn on your mike. I don't think.

Am I

Mr. Martin you can, but I don't know which one it is

Chairperson I don't usually control your mike

Mr. Martin assistant manager, it says it somewhere

Chairperson ummm

Staff attorney A. Seltzer there you go . so to the extent that you're continuing to ask questions that would not be new business-

Chairperson ok

Staff attorney A. Seltzer so if there's a supplemental staff report, or new information, that you've requested, then, the, in my experience, then public comment

Chairperson ok

Staff attorney A. Seltzer would be limited to just the new information.

Chairperson ok

Staff attorney A. Seltzer so as we're just responding to questions.

Chairperson ok, so I just wanted to be clear that we're not expecting a new staff report, and so I think people should not come here expecting to do public comment.

Winterer might we also ask for, uhm, some sort of staff feedback on the reduced alternative that was presented by Mr. Goldman without opening up a new public hearing?

Chairperson well that could be a question of staff, uhm, ah, I assume that's a question of staff and they can answer that question next week when we re-adjourn.

Winterer reconvene.

Chairperson reconvene.

Winterer your, wishful wishful wishful thinking.

Chairperson wishful thinking thank you (laughter)
It's late, I'm tired

Staff attorney A. Seltzer set the date

Chairperson ahm, mr.

Staff attorney A. Seltzer Could you. Yea, You should definitely adjourn to a the date certain

Commissioner Newbold, chairperson

yes

Staff attorney A. Seltzer and mention the date so we don't have to renotice the hearing

Chairperson

can you remind me of the date?

Staff attorney A. Seltzer it's May 30th

Chairperson

So we are going to adjourn this meeting until 7 pm on May 30 two

thousand and twelve. just to be super clear

voices

super clear

Chairperson

ok., thank you everybody.





City of Santa Monica Survey of Potential Relocation Options For Village Trailer Park Residents

The purpose of this survey is for the City to generally understand how many Village Trailer Park residents are interested in each potential relocation option being considered.

following potent	displaced frontial relocation of			.ce?
Move to Mountain \	/iew Mobilehome	Park	AK	
These will be ren			(),	
All units will be 1.			\ \	
 Park rules do not 	allow any mobile	nomes, other	a manufactu	red home:
	contracted to purc		into Mountair	
 Current rents at I 			Y	
Affordability Level	# of Bedrooms	G. Salara	Utility Allowance	Net Ren
Extremely Low_	0		\$48	\$288
Extremely Low	1 4	123534	\$56	\$328
Very Low	0	⇒ 560	\$48	\$512
Very Low		\$640	\$56	\$584
Low	-AX/	\$672	\$48	\$624
Low		\$768	\$56	\$712
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TENANT IMPACT REPORT OPTIONS AS PRESENTED TO RESIDENTS SECRETLY MODIFIED FOR PLANNING COMMISSION MEETING WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION:

- (i) In presenting the TIR to the Planning Commission Staff stated that a supplemental staff report was given to the commission earlier on the day of the meeting. (May 23, 2012) This was not provided to the public.
- (ii) In addition the Relocation Plan options were changed as follows without giving any notice in advance.(Staff Report pp. 161-164)

The relocation option "MOVE TO COMMUNITY CORPORATION OF SANTA MONICA (CCSM) AFFORDABLE APARTMENT " has been removed from the list of options that was presented to the residents in its survey of Potential Relocation Options mailed out to residents on March 29, 2012.

The relocation option "MOVE TO HOUSING THAT IS SPECIFICALLY FOR SENIORS (62+)" (also included in the list of options that was presented to the residents. in its survey of Potential Relocation Options mailed out to residents on March 29, 2012) has been deleted.

"Move to Conventional Rental Housing" appears for the first time as an option (Staff Report p.163)



Transcript of Santa Monica City Planning Commission, May 23, 2012 Meeting O and A with Staff: Part 1

Commissioner Anderson.: Well I guess I would just like the City Attorney's thoughts on the question that commissioner Perry just had about what happens with the Park, and what the procedures are, what the rules are, whether they are state rules or city rules in terms of what the applicant's response was.

Staff attorney A. Seltzer: I think the applicant was stating that in the event a ummm entitlement that would allow him to close the park and convert it to another use was not forthcoming from the city he would attempt to close the park based on the existing notice that he gave years ago and that's tolled by the MOU and for the purpose of holding the land vacant. And I think at this point it's good to go through some background and give you the overarching state law that applies because we're in a situation that umm started in 2006 when the park owner first gave a notice of closure and the City uh was contacted by the Rent Control Board and said before he could close as a matter of local law he needed to get a Removal Permit from the Rent Control Board because the 109 units out there were rent controlled and under the city's rent control Charter Amendment before you can remove a rent control unit you need a removal permit under section 1803 (t) of the Charter Amendment that deals with Rent Control. So there was a dispute between the City, because the city agreed with the Rent Control Board, and the property owner who just wanted to close the Park for purposes of holding it vacant, that was the second notice. We identified the fact that, under Key v Walters, it's probably the most important state case, that you have to identify the purpose for which you're gonna put the park and so they gave an amended notice, but that didn't deal with the removal park permit; so he has, the state law does anticipate mobile home park closures under the Mobile Home Residency law solely to close the park and go out of the business. Alright, to close the Park, but and it requires 12 months notice of closure in such an event. But the state law says that in a situation where a local permit is required. first you obtain the local permit and then you give the 6 month notice, a separate notice to close the park. So we're in a dispute and the Memorandum Of Understanding that's been referred to throughout the night of which you have a copy, and it's eh with the Clerk of the Commission, was a result of deliberations between our City Council and the Park owner in which the dispute over the process for closing the Park which the dispute over the process for closing the park was put off and the developer agreed to apply for a development agreement and the council directed staff to process that agreement so long as the agreement made uh the property development qualify for a removal permit. And that test, there are three tests. under the Charter Amendment but the one selected was that the 109 rent controlled units had to be replaced with 15% affordable and you can see that concept has morphed over time and now you have, and planning staff will help me, I think there's a 148 rent controlled units, 38 of which, which is more than 15% are either extremely low or very low. So that component of the project qualifies for the removal permit which the Rent Control Board would consider before final action by the City Council and it would be conditioned, the RCB's removal permit would be conditioned on the approval of the Development Agreement.

So that's a lot of background information but I think you need that to get some context that we're all in a very difficult position, that the state law, and its in the staff report, basically says that if the park owner, a mobile home park owner follows the rules and procedures that the state has provided for closing or converting a mobile home park they can go out of business

and what we asserted as a city is that our local requirements require you to get a removal permit and the only way you can get a removal permit under our existing land use regime right now is through a development agreement. That's the only entitlement available at this point from my understanding and so, much of the discussion about upzoning etc. really is not applicable because a DA- Development Agreement-has to be consistent with the General Plan which is the Mixed Use Creative District not the zone district. So there's a lot of concern about the issue but the policy consistency is between the DA and the General Plan. And while I'm here so we don't waste time there was a question about whether or not the report that was um...ah..sent to the residents on May 1st was an adequate report, and I appreciate Legal Aid, I did get at least a half a day's notice of their letter, so I could look at that, and basically the tenant, uh the section of the Govt. Code which provides the procedures for mobile home park closures, umm and that's 65863.7 of the Govt Code for people who really wanna know that, requires the preparation of a impact report, and the report doesn't include a relocation plan. The report basically is supposed to address the availability of adequate replacement housing in mobile home parks and relocation costs, in determining to assist the legislative body determine the impact of the conversion or cessation of use on displaced residents of the mobile home park to be converted. So that's the tenant impact report, not the relocation plan. And it's the Civil Code, the Mobilehome Residency law, a compe, a compa, another law of the state that deals with the same subject matter that says that tenant impact report is required to be given to the residents 15 days before the hearing at which the Park owner will appear before a local government board, commission, or body to request permits for a change of use of the mobile home park.

Those are found in section 798.56 of the Civil Code, subsections (h) and (g). In an excess of caution and prudence the staff sent, the Tenant Impact Report to the residents in advance of this commission's un hearing because you are a government board. commission or body at which the developer is appearing to request the permit for the change of use which is the Development Agreement. And that, so, the tenant impact report informs the ultimate relocation plan. It's the City Council that, under the state law, is supposed to review the report, and may require as a condition of the change, and here's the ah, ah, critical language "the park owner to take steps to mitigate any adverse impacts of the conversion on the ability of displaced mobilehome park residents to find adequate housing in a mobile home park and the state's standard is that the steps required to be taken to mitigate shall not exceed the reasonable cost of relocation." That's our standard. That's an action that the council ultimate takes but because you are the recommending advisory body this is all before you because the relocation plan is in the DA but that, the fact that the development agreement with its attachment was provided appropriately under the Brown Act to you and the public doesn't me...after the 15 days, doesn't mean that the TIR, the tenant impact report, wasn't properly given 15 days before that. I hope I didn't confuse, confuse you by that long dis.

Commissioner Winterer: Just to follow up on a couple of things you said. You said early on that the notice of closure ahm couldn't be given until the issuance of a permit.

Staff attorney A. Seltzer: Under the particular circumstances of local law the city took the position, and that's how the MOU was entered, that before the Notice of Closure could be issued there was a permit that the city required an entity related to the city and that's the Rent Control Board

Staff attorney A. Selfzer it's the removal permit, and if there was no removal permit required in the city of Santa Monica or these units were not rent controlled then the Park owner arguably could have given a twelve month notice of closure and the only issue that we would have had to deal with was the adequacy of the tenant impact report and the decision to impose conditions on, to mitigate the impact of, uh uh on displaced residents to find alternative housing in another mobilehome park. At the time we didn't have a mobilehome park closure ordinance and because this was a development agreement it was decided back in 2007 when the MOU was entered that we could negotiate through the DA the type of relocation plan that would be made part of the park closure and the Development Agreement. So the city did not adopt a separate Mobilehome Park Closure ordinance which Carson, Hawthorne, and a number of, Laguna Beach, Huntington Beach, other cities have, because we realize we have one mobile home park in the city that is privately owned and we would address those issues through the Development Agreement process.

Commissioner Winterer: All right, well that leads me to my next question. It says on your staff report on page 27 " as discussed earlier in this report State law provides that the mitigation measures should not exceed the reasonable costs of relocation to another mobile park. Don't we because we are operating under a development agreement have broader discretion about what we ask for those relocation measures?.

Staff attorney A. Seltzer: And that's some of the difficulties you face, you're not in your usual position because the state mobilehome park closure law applies to charter cities and even your entitlement un processes un that you've acquired in order to un unimprovide for this park owner to go out business, so un un, because of the law and because ultimately the park owner can assert that if, in this case I'll use he, un satisfies the requirements of state law in terms of closing the park en en ... that at some point some project, if we're gonna require removal permit... I think the bottom line is that at some point, some project should emerge that is capable of being accomplished ... ahum...so that he can indeed comply, the city can comply with the requirements of the closure laws because if you,... there are risks not allowing closure to occur, because the case law indicates that a mobilehome park owner, if they follow the rules, and seek the permits, and you have an adequate relocation plan that addresses the reasonable costs of relocation, we can talk about that over time, ahum..., as you ask questions, then, you're en, the city is at risk at that point if you require him to stay in the business.

EXHIBIT E

City Council Meeting: December 13, 2011

ORDINANCE NUMBER 2383 (CCS)

(City Council Series)

AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA AMENDING CHAPTERS 4.36 AND 4.56 OF THE SANTA MONICA MUNICIPAL CODE TO INCREASE PERMANENT RELOCATION BENEFITS; CHANGE ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR RELOCATION ENHANCEMENTS; EXTEND TENANT HARASSMENT PROTECTIONS TO ALL TENANTS COVERED BY JUST CAUSE EVICTION RULES; AND CORRECT CERTAIN CODE SECTION REFERENCES

WHEREAS, Santa Monica has not Increased its permanent relocation benefit amounts (other than for cost of living increases) since 2007, during which time rent levels in the City have increased and vacancies have decreased; and

WHEREAS, Council wishes to extend additional permanent relocation benefits to households with seniors, disabled, and children tenants regardless of their date of occupancy because these households are particularly vulnerable; and

WHEREAS, certain code section references in the permanent relocation ordinance are outdated and inaccurate; and

WHEREAS, Measure RR has extended just cause eviction protections to most residential tenants in the City regardless of rent control status; and

WHEREAS, certain non-rent controlled tenants are therefore newly subject to potential unlawful harassment for the purpose of forcing them to vacate their units; and

WHEREAS, Council wishes to extend tenant harassment protections to all tenants in the City who have just cause eviction protections, regardless of their rent control status.

NOW, THEREFORE, THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA DOES HEREBY ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. Municipal Code Section 4.36.020 is amended to read as follows:

4.36.020 When relocation fee required.

- (a) A relocation fee shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter by any landlord who terminates or causes the termination of a tenancy for any of the following reasons:
- (1) The landlord seeks to withdraw all rental housing units from the rental housing market as provided in Government Code Sections 7060 et seq.
- (2) The landlord seeks to recover possession of a rental housing unit pursuant to Sections 1806(a)(8), 1806(a)(9), 2304(a)(8), or 2304(a)(9) of the City Charter.
- (3) The landlord seeks to recover possession to demolish or otherwise withdraw a rental housing unit from residential rental housing use, including units that were illegally converted to residential use, after having obtained all proper permits from the City, if any such permits are required.
- (b) A relocation fee shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter to a displaced tenant who serves a landlord with a notice to

terminate tenancy after having received written notice from either the landlord or the Santa Monica Rent Control Board that the landlord has filed a Notice of Intent to Withdraw Residential Rental Units pursuant to Government Code Section 7060.4 and Santa Monica Rent Control Board Regulation 16002(a) or an Application for Removal Permit pursuant to Santa Monica Charter Section 1803(t).

(c) The fee required by this Chapter shall be due and payable to a displaced tonant whether or not the landlord actually utilizes the rental housing unit for the purposes stated in the notice of eviction.

SECTION 2. Municipal Code Section 4.36.040 is amended to read as follows:

4.36.040 Amount of relocation fee.

The amount of the permanent relocation fee payable pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter shall be established in accordance with the following formula: 2011 relocation fee adjusted for inflation by the percentage change in the rent of primary residence component of the CPI-W Index for the Los Angeles/Riverside/Orange County area, as published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, between November 2011 and the July 1st preceding the date of vacancy rounded to the nearest fifty dollars. This amount shall be updated annually commencing on July 1, 2012 and on July 1st of each year thereafter.

(a) The 2011 relocation fee established pursuant to Ordinance 2383CCS and determined according to the size of the retail housing unit, was as follows:

Apartment size	2011 relocation amount	2011 augmented amount
Single or studio	\$7,800	\$8,900
One bedroom	\$12,050	\$13,850
Two or more bedrooms	\$16,300	\$18,750

- (b) If a tenant is evicted from more than one rental housing unit on a property, the tenant shall not be entitled to receive separate relocation fees for each rental housing unit. The tenant shall receive a single relocation fee based on the combined total number of bedrooms in the rental housing units from which the tenant is being evicted. If one of the rental housing units is a bachelor or single unit, it shall be counted as a one bedroom unit for purposes of determining the amount of the relocation fee (e.g., a tenant who is evicted from a bachelor rental housing unit and a one bedroom-rental housing unit would receive relocation-benefits for a two bedroom unit).
- (c) If the rental housing unit from which the tenant is being evicted is furnished, two hundred fifty dollars shall be deducted from the amount set forth in subsection (a) of this Section. For purposes of this subsection, a rental housing unit shall be considered to be furnished if the landlord has provided substantial furnishings in each occupied room of the rental housing unit.
- (d) If one or more of the displaced tenants is a senior citizen or disabled person, or is a tenant with whom a minor child resides, an augmented amount shall be paid as set forth in subsection (a) of this Section. The amount added pursuant to this subsection shall be adjusted

annually pursuant to the formula specified above commencing on July 1, 2012, and each July 1st thereafter.

(e) Any tenant still in possession of a rental unit after the relocation amounts have been updated pursuant to this Section, shall be entitled to the updated relocation amounts even if the landlord commenced the termination of the tenancy prior to the update. In the event that a landlord has already complied with the provisions of Section 4.36.060 based on the relocation amounts previously in effect, but has not yet received a written request from a tenant for distribution of the fee pursuant to Section 4.36.070, the landlord shall place in escrow the additional amount of relocation fee required by this Section within five working days of the effective date of the updated amount.

SECTION 3. Municipal Code Section 4.56.010 is amended to read as follows: 4.56.010 Definitions.

- (a) Fraud. Intentional misrepresentation, deceit or concealment of a material fact.
- (b) Housing Service. Housing services include, but are not limited to, hot and cold water, heat, electricity, gas, refrigeration, elevator service, window shades and screens, storage, kitchen, bath and laundry facilities and privileges, janitor services, refuse removal, furnishings, telephone, parking, effective waterproofing and weather protection, painting, and any other benefit, privilege or facility that has been provided by the landlord to the tenant with use or occupancy of any rental housing unit. Services to a

rental housing unit shall include a proportionate part of services provided to common facilities of the building in which the rental housing unit is contained.

- (c) Landlord. An owner, lessor, sublessor, or any other person entitled to receive rent for the use and occupancy of any rental housing unit, or an agent, representative or successor of any of the foregoing.
 - (d) Malice. An intent to vex, annoy, harass or injure another person.
- (e) Rental Housing Agreement. An agreement, oral or written or implied, between a landlord and tenant for use or occupancy of a rental housing unit and for housing services.
- (f) Rental Housing Unit. A housing unit in the City that constitutes either a controlled rental unit pursuant to City Charter Section 1800 et seq. (Including a room in a single-family home, hotel or motel, rooming house or apartment, single-family home, mobile home or mobile home space, trailer or trailer space); or a rental unit pursuant to City Charter Section 2300 et seq.
- (g) Tenant. A tenant, subtenant, lessee, sublessee or any other person entitled under the terms of a rental housing agreement to the use or occupancy of any rental housing unit.

SECTION 4. Any provision of the Santa Monica Municipal Code or appendices thereto inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, to the extent of such inconsistencies and no further, is hereby repealed or modified to that extent necessary to effect the provisions of this Ordinance.

SECTION 5. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase of this Ordinance is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by a decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this Ordinance. The City Council hereby declares that it would have passed this Ordinance and each and every section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase not declared invalid or unconstitutional without regard to whether any portion of the ordinance would be subsequently declared invalid or unconstitutional.

SECTION 6. The Mayor shall sign and the City Clerk shall attest to the passage of this Ordinance. The City Clerk shall cause the same to be published once in the official newspaper within 15 days after its adoption. This Ordinance shall become effective 30 days from its adoption.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MARSHA JONES MOUTRIE

City Attorney

Approved and adopted this 13th day of December, 2011.

Richa	rd Blo	om, Ma	VOL	
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State of California County of Los Angeles City of Santa Monica

I, Denise Anderson-Warren, Acting City Clerk of the City of Santa Monica, do hereby certify that the foregoing Ordinance No. 2383 (CCS) had its Introduction on December 6, 2011, and was adopted at the Santa Monica City Council meeting held on December 13, 2011, by the following vote:

Ayes:

Council members: Holbrook, McKeown, O'Connor, Shriver

Mayor Pro Tem Davis, Mayor Bloom

Noes:

Council members:

None

Absent

Council members: O'Day

A summary of Ordinance No. 2383 (CCS) was duly published pursuant to California Government Code Section 40806.

ATTEST:

Denise Anderson-Warren, Acting City Clerk